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CREATIVE MANIPULATION OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: IS THERE DIVERSITY
AFTER DEATH?
Linda S. Mullenix t
INTRODUCTION

One of the major purposes of the Supreme Court's decision in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins' was to eliminate or drastically curtail
the evil of forum shopping.2 Forum shopping continues, however,
notwithstanding the well-known strictures of Erie. Indeed, in recent
years, federal courts have been bedeviled by a series of cases involving creative manipulation of diversity jurisdiction in estate-related
litigation. Lacking clear guidance from the Supreme Court,3 district
and circuit courts have articulated a confusing array of principles
and tests to govern jurisdictional questions in estate-related
4
litigation.
As a consequence, a litigant can manipulate federal diversity requirements effectively in some jurisdictions, but not in others. 5
t Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of
America. B.A. 1971, City College of New York; M. Phil. 1974, Columbia University;
Ph.D. 1977, Columbia University; J.D. 1980, Georgetown University Law Center.
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 The twin aims of the Erie rule were characterized by the Court as "discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws."
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (footnote omitted). The Hanna Court
viewed Erie as a reaction to the practice of forum shopping that had developed in the
wake of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467. See Black &
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518
(1928) (diversity jurisdiction existed although plaintiff reincorporated solely to create
diversity); see also O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1036 (2d Cir. 1969) (forum
shopping in estate litigation viewed as an evil Erie doctrine was designed to prevent).
3 Only two Supreme Court decisions address jurisdictional issues in estate-related
litigation. Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, 394 U.S. 823 (1969); Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
4 See infra notes 107-49 and accompanying text. For an excellent summary of the
development of these different approaches see Bianca v. Parke-Davis Pharmaceutical
Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 723 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984).
5 In Bianca v. Parke-Davis the Fifth Circuit adopted the "motive/function" test, see
infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text, to ascertain whether a nonresident administratrix's citizenship should determine jurisdiction. 723 F.2d at 397-98. Had the plaintiff
filed in a circuit applying the "substantial stake" test, however, she would not have been
able to maintain her suit in federal court.
[I]t is apparent that [the administratrix] has no substantial stake in the
outcome of the wrongful death action. Though [she] asserts that Mississippi's Wrongful Death Statute vests in her substantive powers and duties
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Thus, some litigants may successfuly establish diversity jurisdiction
while their counterparts in other states fail to get into federal court
on similar facts. 6 These inconsistent results produce a discriminatory effect among litigants of different states. The jurisdictional
tests are also difficult to apply, easy to manipulate, and not conso7
nant with the purposes underlying diversity jurisdiction.
The use of manipulative tactics to secure a federal forum in estate-related litigation will continue to be a problem.8 Because of the
confusion among the lower federal courts, the rules for determining
proper diversity jurisdiction are ripe for reconsideration. Until
clearly formulated rules are articulated, the lower federal courts will
issue ad hoc, fact-bound decisions amounting to little more than jurisdictional babble. Thus, the Supreme Court and Congress must
reconsider the rules for determining jurisdiction in estate-related
cases in light of the purposes underlying diversity jurisdiction. 9 To
this end, Congress should amend or repeal the collusive joinder
statute; this action would alleviate the necessity of engaging in problematic inquiries into parties' motivations in seeking a federal fowhich belie any claim that she is a "straw fiduciary," she does not lay
claim to any portion of any recovery in the wrongful death action, and she
does not credibly claim that her function as administratrix was to do more
than prosecute this lawsuit.
Id. at 398. For a discussion of the substantial stake test, see infra notes 129-49 and
accompanying text.
6
It is ironic that this discrimination is precisely what Erie intended to eliminate.
See supra note 2.
7 The often articulated rationale for diversity jurisdiction is to prevent state court
prejudice against out-of-state litigants. See American Law Institute, Study of the Division
ofJurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts §§ 101-03 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Division ofJurisdiction Study]; see also Betar v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., 603 F.2d
30 (7th Cir. 1979) ("the purpose of diversity jurisdiction [is] to prevent local prejudice"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1098 (1980); Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.)
(federal jurisdiction is to prevent prejudice in state courts), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056
(1974); O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1969) (same); McSparran v.
Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Fritzinger v. Weist, 395
U.S. 903 (1969); and Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1968) (same).
8 In McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 871 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.
Fritzinger v. Weist, 395 U.S. 903 (1969), the Third Circuit noted that the "rivulet of
'manufactured' diversity cases [had] swollen to a stream of wide dimensions." In McSpartan a Pennsylvania Orphans' Court appointed an out-of-state guardian to prosecute
a personal injury claim in federal court because larger verdicts were usually obtained
there. The McSparran court acknowledged that in a two year period, 20.5% of the diversity cases in the Pennsylvania district court were brought by out-of-state personal representatives of Pennsylvania citizens against Pennsylvania defendants. Id. One out-ofstate resident was a guardian in 61 pending diversity suits in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. Id.
9 See supra note 7.
The desirability of retaining federal diversity jurisdiction is much debated. For a
summary of the competing arguments, see Division ofJurisdiction Study, supra note 7,
§§ 99-110. This Article supports and assumes retention of federal diversityjurisdiction.
See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
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rum. Further, Congress should promulgate a per se rule that the
citizenship of the beneficiaries should govern jurisdiction in estaterelated litigation. This rule not only is consonant with the purposes
of diversity jurisdiction, but also avoids most of the problems that
attend other approaches. Lastly, the Court should reject the tests
currently utilized by the federal appellate courts and affirm a per se
citizenship rule as a prerequisite to access to federal court.
This Article examines the treatment the Supreme Court and
Congress have given diversity jurisdiction in estate litigation. Next,
it examines different approaches taken by the circuits and discusses
the American Law Institute's proposal on this subject. Finally, the
Article argues that the citizenship of the beneficiaries should govern
jurisdiction in estate-related litigation because such a rule would
best effectuate the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
I
FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN ESTATE-RELATED
LITIGATION

Consider the following situations:
(1) An Indian national dies in an airplane crash in Zambia, Africa. He leaves a wife and children who are all Indian nationals. As
beneficiaries to his estate, they appoint an Illinois citizen to administer the estate, which contains no assets other than the wrongful
death action arising out of the airplane crash. The administrator
files suit against the airplane's Canadian manufacturer in Illinois
state court. The Canadian defendant removes the action to a federal district court in Illinois. The administrator then petitions for a
remand to the state court, arguing that the federal court lacks jurisdiction. The district court denies this petition. The court of appeals
reverses, holding that even though the nominal plaintiff is an Illinois
citizen, the action is essentially a suit by Indian nationals against a
Canadian corporation. The court reasons that a defendant who attempts to remove to federal court cannot base diversity jurisdiction
on the administrator's citizenship. The court concludes that this
suit is between aliens, and thus is outside the original jurisdiction of
the federal courts. 10
(2) An eleven-year-old child contracts aplastic anemia and dies
after taking a cold medication prescribed by the family doctor. The
child's parents wish to sue the physician, as well as the supplier and
manufacturer of the medication, but because the parents are alleg10 See Betar v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., 603 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1098 (1980). The court utilized a "substantial stake in the outcome of the
litigation" test to reach this result. Id. at 35; see infra notes 129-49 and accompanying
text.
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edly despondent and traumatized by the daughter's death, they feel
incapable of prosecuting the lawsuit. The Mississippi Chancery
Court names the child's aunt, a Louisiana citizen, administratrix of
the child's estate. The Louisiana administratrix then files a wrongful death action against the physician, supplier, and manufacturer,
all from Mississippi, in federal district court in Mississippi. The
court dismisses the suit for lack of federal jurisdiction. On appeal,
the court of appeals reverses, holding that the administratrix's citizenship may be used to establish diversity unless she was appointed
with a motive to create diversity where it would not otherwise
exist. 11
(3) An Oklahoma citizen dies of medical complications, leaving
her severely disabled husband and two grown daughters as heirs.
One of the daughters, also an Oklahoma citizen, is appointed administratrix. She completes her duties as the estate fiduciary but
does not bring a wrongful death action against the hospital and physicians who treated her mother. The daughter then resigns as administratrix and appoints her sister, a Colorado citizen, as successor
administratrix. The new administratrix immediately commences a
wrongful death action in federal district court in Oklahoma. A
month after filing suit in federal court, she moves to Oklahoma,
making that her permanent residence. The defendants move to dismiss for lack of diversity and, alternatively, for collusive appointment of a fiduciary. The trial court grants this motion, but the court
of appeals reverses, holding that diversity exists because the successor administratrix had a real and substantial stake in the outcome of
the litigation, sufficient to support proper diversity jurisdiction in
12
federal court.
These cases all raise the troublesome issue of whose citizenship
may be used for establishing diversity jurisdiction in estate litigation: the decedent's, the beneficiaries', or the estate representative's? Behind this relatively simple question lie a myriad of
complex issues. For example, if the estate representative's citizenship governs jurisdiction, are there significant distinctions among
estate representatives-executors, administrators, guardians, and
trustees-to warrant different treatment? 13 Does it matter whether
11 See Bianca v. Parke-Davis Pharmaceutical Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 723 F.2d
392 (5th Cir. 1984). The court adopted the "motive/function" analysis in arriving at its
conclusion. Id at 398; see infra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
12 See Hackney v. Newman Memorial Hosp., 621 F.2d 1069 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 982 (1980). The court endorsed the "substantial stake" approach in determining whether the administratrix was more than a straw party. Id. at 1071.
A number of courts and commentators have suggested that the legal status of the
13
fiduciary determines jurisdiction.
The substantive status of the various kinds of representatives is not, of
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the administrator is appointed by a court, designated in advance by
the decedent, or nominated by the estate beneficiaries?1 4 How does
the federal proscription against improper and collusive joinder of
parties apply to an administrator's appointment?1 5 If an appointment is valid under state law, can it be invalid for federal jurisdiccourse, uniform, and their authority and duties differ widely. In general,
executors, although acting by virtue of court appointment, owe their position to their designation by the testator, and administrators to their relationship to the deceased intestate. While an executor or administrator
takes title to the property of the decedent, a guardian of the person of a
minor or other incompetent has no interest in his ward's property and a
guardian of his estate does not take legal title to the property, which remains in the ward, but merely acts as its custodian or manager. A trustee,
on the other hand, is of course vested with the legal title to the property
of the trust.
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 870 (3d Cir. 1968) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 903 (1969). The Supreme Court also has noted that estate representatives may
differ as to their status and power under state law, but the Court has refused to speculate
whether these distinctions should be determinative of federal diversity jurisdiction. See
Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, 394 U.S. 823, 828 n.9 (1969). In a number of cases, lower
courts chose not to distinguish among representatives. E.g., Messer v. American Gems,
Inc., 612 F.2d 1367, 1369 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); Betar v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., 603 F.2d 30, 34 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1098 (1980);
County of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470, 472 (8th Cir. 1961). In other cases, courts
distinguished among representatives. Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 588 F.2d
914, 917 (4th Cir. 1978); Rogers v. Bates, 431 F.2d 16, 19-20 (8th Cir. 1970); Lester v.
McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101, 1103-04 (4th Cir. 1969). See also C. WIGrr, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3640 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE]; Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Rule: A Pleafor its Abolition,
32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 926, 962-63 (1957) (arguing for different treatment for different
guardians); Kennedy, Federal Rule 17(a): Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand?, 51
MINN. L. REV. 675, 706-08 (1967) (discussing courts' distinction between guardian and
administrator); Note, ManufacturedFederalDiversityJurisdictionand Section 1359, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 706, 715 n.36 (1969) (noting different treatment of guardians and administrators) [hereinafter cited as Note, Manufactured Federal Diversity]; Note, FederalCourts-Appointment of Administratorto Defeat DiversityJurisdiction-Millerv. Perry, 22 J. PUB. L. 293,
398 (1973) (recognizing distinction between ancillary and general administrator) [hereinafter cited as Note, Appointment of Administrator]; Comment, Federal Courts-DiversityJurisdiction-When State Law Requires Wrongful Death Action to be Prosecuted by Resident Ancillary
Administrator, Citizenship of Beneficiaries is Controlling For Diversity Purposes-Millerv. Perry,
47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 807-08 (1972) (discussing different treatment of administrators
and other representatives).
14 There is an opportunity for improper or collusive behavior where the beneficiaries of an estate nominate or appoint the estate representative. A decedent naming
an executor in his will is less likely to do so in contemplation of litigation in federal
court. Finally, if the court appoints an estate administrator, any suggestion of collusiveness would imply that the state behaved improperly. See Messer v. American Gems, Inc.,
612 F.2d 1367, 1373 n.8 (4th Cir.) ("The decedent, divorced from his wife, in taking the
altogether reasonable step of naming his sister as executrix could not be charged with
prescient plotting to achieve diversity jurisdiction should he die in circumstances giving
rise to a wrongful death claim."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 588 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1978) (designation of executrix in a will
found not collusive).
15 See infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
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tional purposes? 16 Of what significance are federal and state real
party in interest rules to the proper resolution ofjurisdictional questions?1 7 If the federal court looks to the beneficiaries' citizenship,
should diversity be destroyed when one of the beneficiaries lives in
the same jurisdiction as the defendant?' 8 May a beneficiary create
or destroy diversity jurisdiction by changing domicile or appointing
a nonresident administrator? 19 When state law requires that an administrator be a resident, will a nonresident beneficiary be able to
20
bring a wrongful death action in a federal forum?
At first blush, federal jurisdiction in estate cases appears relatively simple to establish. The basic diversity statute 2 ' authorizes
federal jurisdiction where the parties to the action are citizens of
different states. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1722 and the federal anti-collusion statute, 2 3 however, limit that rule. The real party
in interest under rule 17 must bring the suit, and the rule specifies
that executors, administrators, and guardians may litigate an action
in their own name without joining the person on whose behalf they
are acting. 24 The federal anti-collusion statute denies federal jurisdiction to any civil action when a party has been improperly or collusivelyjoined in order to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court. 25
Despite the apparent clarity of these rules, the federal courts
have not done well in resolving jurisdictional disputes in estate-re16

See Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972) (upholding validity of North Caro-

lina statute requiring resident ancillary administrator to prosecute wrongful death ac-

tions). Miller raised the issue whether statutes such as North Carolina's violate the
supremacy clause when they defeat federal jurisdiction. Id. at 64, 67-68. The North
Carolina statute was subsequently repealed. For other cases examining the relationship
between state law and the supremacy clause, see Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial
Hosp., 588 F.2d 914, 916 n.2 (4th Cir. 1978); Vaughan v. Southern Ry., 542 F.2d 641,
646 (4th Cir. 1976) (Butzner, J., dissenting).
17 See infra notes 90-106 and accompanying text. See generally Atkinson, supra note
13; Kennedy, supra note 13.
18 In Vaughan v. Southern Ry., 542 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1976), the court held that the
citizenship of the beneficiaries was controlling on the jurisdictional question. In his dissent, Judge Butzner articulated several problems raised by this rule. Id. at 646-47
(Butzner, J., dissenting).
19 See Hackney v. Newman Memorial Hosp., 621 F.2d 1069, 1070 (10th Cir.) (administratrix's change of domicile after institution of wrongful death action does not destroy diversity), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980).
20 The Supreme Court seems to have laid this issue to rest in Kramer v. Caribbean
Mills, 394 U.S. 823 (1969). "The existence of federal jurisdiction is a matter of federal,
not state, law." Id. at 829. Nevertheless, litigants still argue that state laws governing
estate administration affect federal diversity. See, e.g., Bianca v. Parke-Davis Pharmaceutical Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 723 F.2d 392, 398 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984); O'Brien v.
Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1034 (2d Cir. 1969).
21
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
FED. R. Crv. P. 17.
22
23
28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982).
24
FED. R. Civ. P. 17.
28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982).
25
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lated cases. Lower court difficulties stem, in part, from a lack of
clear Supreme Court guidance. The two Supreme Court cases most
commonly cited in this context do not focus squarely on the question of whose citizenship should be used to establish diversity in
estate-related cases. 2 6 Nonetheless, the lower federal courts have
taken their analytical cues from these two decisions to develop complex principles and rules.
The circuit courts have articulated two distinct tests for determining the validity of federal jurisdiction in estate-related litigation:
the "motive/function" test and the "substantial stake in the outcome of the litigation" test. 27 The motive/function approach requires the court to make a factual inquiry into the motives for the
fiduciary's appointment as well as an examination of his duties as
estate representative. The substantial stake test considers whether
the estate fiduciary has a significant interest in any estate-related litigation that he prosecutes on behalf of the decedent's estate. The
American Law Institute, mindful of this legal problem and its current judicial treatment, has proposed a third alternative. The A.L.I.
rejects any jurisdictional test requiring evidentiary hearings into
motives or functions and has recommended a per se rule that the
28
decedent's citizenship controls all jurisdictional issues.
A.

The Supreme Court's Treatment

Traditionally, probate matters, like most domestic relations litigation, have not been within the purview of the federal courts and
therefore jurisdictional contests have been rare. 2 9 Although the
Court has suggested that proper diversity jurisdiction can exist between an estate administrator as plaintiff and an opposing defendant,3 0 it has never squarely addressed the issue of whose citizenship
courts count when a plaintiff seeks a federal forum in an estate ad26
Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931), concerned a litigant
attempting to destroy, rather than create, diversity jurisdiction. This tactic does not
come within the statutory prohibition of 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982). See infra notes 35-52
and accompanying text. Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, 394 U.S. 823 (1969), involved a
collusive assignment of a contract claim and did not involve estate-related litigation; see
infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
27 The motive/function test was first articulated by the Third Circuit in McSparran
v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969). The
"substantial stake in the outcome" test was first articulated by the Fourth Circuit in
Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
28
Division ofJurisdiction Study, supra note 7, § 1301(b)(4), at 117-19.
29
See C. WIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 143-46 (4th ed. 1983); Note, Federal
Jurisdiction in Matters Relating to Probate and Administration, 43 HARv. L. REV. 462 (1930);
Comment, Federal Court Probate Proceedings,45 IND. L.J. 387 (1970); Note, FederalJurisdiction and Practice: Probate Matters, 15 OKLA. L. REv. 462 (1962).
3o Mecom, 284 U.S. at 186 (citing Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642
(1823)).
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ministration matter, most commonly the prosecution of a wrongful
death action.3 ' In spite of this, lower federal courts analyze jurisdictional questions in the mistaken belief that the Court has spoken on
the subject, a misapprehension that has encouraged a proliferation
of inconsistent rules among the circuits.
Lower federal courts have relied on two Supreme Court decisions: Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.3 2 and Kramer v. Caribbean
Mills, Inc. 33 Although they are treated as precedent on the issue of
federal jurisdiction in estate-related litigation, both cases are factually inapposite to the situations typically before the lower courts. As
a result, they are virtually useless to courts that must decide whose
citizenship may be used to establish diversity. At its worst, these two
34
Supreme Court cases are utilized to justify inconsistent principles.
And ironically, although the Court has never spoken to the jurisdictional problem in estate-related litigation, lower federal courts adjudicate this issue as though the Court has so spoken.
1. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co. and the Rule that
Motive Is Irrelevant
In Mecom, 35 an Oklahoma widow who was the administratrix of
her husband's estate twice instituted wrongful death actions in
Oklahoma state court against a Louisiana corporate defendant. On
both occasions, the defendant removed the lawsuits to federal district court, and, in each instance, the widow dismissed her suit. After the second dismissal, the widow resigned as administratrix and
asked the Oklahoma probate court to appoint Mecom, a Louisiana
resident, estate administrator. Mecom filed a third wrongful death
action in state court, and the defendant again attempted to remove
the action to federal court. This time, however, removal was improper because the plaintiff and defendant were citizens of the same
31
Mecom involved a suit by an administratrix for recovery of damages under the
Oklahoma wrongful death statute for the loss of her husband. Id. at 184.
32 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
3 394 U.S. 823 (1969).
34 The Mecom decision has been consistently cited for the principle that the motives
of a litigant in seeking a federal forum are immaterial to the federal court's jurisdictional
analysis. See Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 235, 236 (2d Cir. 1963) (relying on
Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959));Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421,
425 (8th Cir. 1962); County of Todd, Minn. v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470, 473 (8th Cir.
1961); Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 786 (3d Cir. 1959); McCoy v. Blakely,
217 F.2d 227, 230 (8th Cir. 1955); and Jaffe v. Philadelphia & W.R.R., 180 F.2d 1010,
1012 (3d Cir. 1950), rev'd, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968). The Kramer decision has been
construed as endorsing the proposition that motives are material to a court's jurisdictional analysis, particularly where § 1359 is implicated. See, e.g., Bianca v. Parke-Davis,
723 F.2d at 395.
35 Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
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state.3 6 The Tenth Circuit determined that the motive for Mecom's
of citizenship that had
appointment was to eliminate the diversity
37
justified removal in the earlier lawsuits.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the motive behind
the administrator's appointment was immaterial. Under Oklahoma
law, a nonresident can be appointed administrator. The Court reasoned that it was "immaterial that the motive for obtaining[Mecom's] appointment and qualification was that he might thus be clothed with a right to
institute an action which could not be so removed on the ground of diversity of
citizenship." 38 Therefore, Mecom can be read to stand for the proposition that when a party validly appoints an estate representative,
inquiries into motive are immaterial to diversity and constitute an
impermissible collateral attack on a state court's decree validating
the appointment.3 9
This rule governed circuit court decisions for almost twenty
years. 40 In 1968, the Third Circuit revisited this problem and decided that motive was indeed a relevant concern in determining federal jurisdiction in estate-related litigation. 4 ' The Third Circuit was
the first court to notice that Mecom's facts were sufficiently different
from the typical estate cases to render the Mecom rule inapplicable in
42
most estate-related cases.
Id. at 184-85.
Id. at 185.
38
Id. at 190.
39
[I]t
is clear that the motive or purpose that actuated any or all of these
parties in procuring a lawful and valid appointment is immaterial upon
the question of identity or diversity of citizenship. To go behind the decree of the probate court would be collaterally to attack it, not for lack of
jurisdiction of the subject-matter qr absence ofjurisdictional facts, but to
inquire into purposes and motives of the parties before that court when,
confessedly, they practiced no fraud upon it.
Id. at 189. For a discussion of the Mecom decision, see Note, ManufacturedFederalDiversity, supra note 13, at 717; Case Comment, Federal Courts-Jurisdiction:Diversity of Citizenship-Appointment of Administrator From Defendant's State To Defeat Diversity Jurisdiction, 45
HARV. L. REv. 743 (1932); Recent Decision, FederalJurisdiction-Diversityof CitizenshipSuit Under Death Act, 30 MICH. L.REv. 1341 (1932); Comment, supra note 13, at 803;
Note, The Manufacture of State or FederalJurisdiction,41 YALE L.J. 639 (1932).
40 Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421,425 (8th Cir. 1962); County of Todd v. Loegering,
297 F.2d 470, 472-75 (8th Cir. 1961); Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 786,
788 n.10 (3d Cir. 1955);Jaffe v. Philadelphia & W. R.R., 180 F.2d 1010, 1010-12 (3d Cir.
1950), rev'd 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).
41
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969). See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. For commentary on the McSparran decision, see 3AJ. MOORE &J. LucAs, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.05 [2.2] (2d
ed. 1984); FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 13, § 3640 [103-04]; Note,
ManufacturedFederal Diversity, supra note 13, at 719.
42 The fundamental distinction between Mecom and the present case is that
there the collusion statute was not involved because the resignation of
the administratrix and the appointment of her successor were acts done
not to create federal jurisdiction but to prevent it from attaching. Section
36
37
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Three factors render Mecom unique. First, Mecom involved a litigant who manipulated parties to destroy diversity jurisdiction,
rather than to create it. 4 3 This tactic does not implicate the anticollusion statute which prohibits the joinder of parties in order to
create federal jurisdiction. 4 4 Thus, the Court's decision that motive
was immaterial was logical in this factual context. The Court has
not yet spoken on the validity ofjurisdiction when an estate fiduciary is appointed specifically to create diversity, an act directly implicating the anti-collusion statute.
The second unusual feature of Mecom is that the jurisdiction issue was raised in a removal action. The original administratrix prevented removal by appointing a nondiverse administrator. 4 5 She
clearly did not wish to avail herself of the benefits of a federal court;
rather, the corporate defendant sought a federal forum. In evaluating these maneuvers, the Court analogized to cases where the plaintiff sued in state court and brought in nondiverse defendants. 46 In
those situations, a plaintiff's motives in joining defendants are immaterial provided there is a good faith action against the joined parties. That rule embodies the federal policy of according
considerable deference to the plaintiff's choice of forum and denying jurisdiction even when the plaintiff has deliberately joined nondiverse parties to avoid removal. Unlike the administratrix in
Mecom, most estate fiduciaries choose to sue in federal court. Therefore, in those cases, original jurisdiction rules, not removal princi47
ples, apply.
1359, as its language clearly shows, expresses a policy against the creation of federal jurisdiction and not against its avoidance. It proscribes
improper or collusive conduct "to invoke" diversity jurisdiction and
hence was inapplicable in the Mecom case.
McSparran, 402 F.2d at 875 (footnote omitted).
43 For years lower courts ignored this and cited Mecom to support jurisdiction when
litigants tried to create diversity. See supra note 34 (citing cases).
In Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1962), a husband died of injuries he
received in an automobile accident in Nebraska. A Nebraska court appointed his widow
as administratrix of his estate. Two months after this appointment, the administratrix
moved to Kansas and filed a wrongful death action against the defendants in federal
district court in Nebraska. The Eighth Circuit held that the Nebraska district court had
jurisdiction of the action against Nebraska residents. Id. at 427. The court relied on
Mecom in concluding that the representative's citizenship controlled. The court failed,
however, to note that in Mecom the administrator's appointment destroyed diversity,
while here the plaintiff was attempting to create diversity.
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982). See alsoJ. MOORE &J. LUCAS, supra note 41, 17.05;
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 13, § 3637.
45 Mecom, 284 U.S. at 185.
46
Id. at 189.
47
Removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982). The principles governing removal jurisdiction are somewhat different than those governing originaljurisdiction. See
C.WRIGi-T, supra note 29, at 209-34. For example, resident defendants are denied access
to federal courts by the removal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982). The same resi-
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Finally, Mecom is limited in its precedential value by the Court's
focus on the real party in interest. The Oklahoma probate court
appointed a Louisiana citizen as estate administrator. 48 He thus became a trustee of an express trust under Oklahoma law. As administrator, he was required to prosecute any wrongful death action,
distribute the recovery to the beneficiaries, and act with diligence in
order to avoid liability for breach of his fiduciary duties. 4 9 The
Court concluded that because of these requirements, the administrator was the real party in interest and his citizenship, rather than
that of the beneficiaries or the decedent, should govern federal
50
jurisdiction.
However, not all estate representatives are court-appointed.
Furthermore, the duties of fiduciaries vary greatly from state to
state, 5 ' and a fiduciary's designation as the real party in interest depends on the representative's legal duties. Therefore, Mecom is not
applicable where the administrator's duties are not sufficient to
52
make him a real party in interest.
Mecom avoided the issue of whether joinder in order to create
federal jurisdiction in estate-related litigation is proper. Although
the decision allowed a litigant who chose a state forum to avoid removal by designating a nondiverse plaintiff, the Court failed to decide whether a litigant could choose to bring the initial action in a
federal forum by employing the same tactic. Furthermore, Mecom
did not distinguish among administrators, executors, trustees and
guardians as possible plaintiffs; nor did the opinion examine how a
fiduciary's duties might affect his status as a real party in interest.
Finally, Mecom said nothing about the materiality of a plaintiff's motives in seeking a federal forum for litigation of an estate matter.
The Mecom decision innocently engendered more than fifty
years of judicial confusion concerning whether a litigant's motives
are relevant to a court's jurisdictional inquiry. After years of consistent application, most courts have now rejected the Mecom rule that
dents, however, are not precluded from invoking the original jurisdiction of the federal
court as a plaintiff. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 29, at 170-71, 214-15.
48 Mecom, 284 U.S. at 185.
49 Id. at 186-87.
50 Id. at 189-90.
51 The crucial distinction among estate fiduciaries is whether they have other duties
in addition to prosecuting the wrongful death action. Where this is the only asset in the
estate, courts carefully scrutinize the appointment of a non-resident fiduciary. O'Brien
v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1034 (2d Cir. 1969). ("The appointment of an administrator ad litem, whose sole function is to collect the proceeds of a lawsuit and turn them
over to the beneficiary, is far more akin to the 'collection' than the 'actual transfer' line
of cases.").
52 The Kramer Court noted this problem but failed to resolve it. Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, 394 U.S. 823, 828 n.9 (1969).
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motive is irrelevant to jurisdictional analysis, but unfortunately this
repudiation has resulted in a split among the circuits concerning the
principles applicable in jurisdictional disputes. Although some
courts believe that Mecom is still a vital precedent, numerous decisions have significantly eroded its continuing authority. Mecom remains a problematic precedent that offers unclear guidance for
jurisdictional analysis.
2.

Kramer v. Caribbean Mills and the Principle
of Collusive Joinder

Nearly forty years after Mecom, the Supreme Court announced
in Kramer v. Caribbean Mills 53 that joinder of a party for the purpose
of invoking diversity jurisdiction is improper. 54 Kramer represents
the Supreme Court's only interpretation of the anti-collusion statute
since its revision in 1948. 55 However, the opinion offers little guidance to lower federal courts attempting to determine jurisdiction
in estate-related litigation.
In Kramer the real party in interest assigned a contract claim to a
nominal plaintiff for the purpose of litigating in a federal forum.
The underlying dispute arose from a breach of contract between
Caribbean Mills, a Haitian corporation, and the Panama and Venezuela Finance Company, a Panamanian corporation. According to
their agreement, Caribbean agreed to purchase corporate stock
from Panama on an installment basis. When Caribbean failed to
make payment, Panama assigned its entire interest in the agreement
to Kramer, a Texas attorney, for $1.00. In a second contract, executed the same day, Kramer agreed to pay Panama 95% of any recovery he received from Caribbean. 56 Kramer sued Caribbean in
federal district court in Texas basing jurisdiction on the diversity
between himself and Caribbean. 57 The Fifth Circuit 58 and the
Supreme Court 5 9 both held that the district court lacked jurisdiction
because the assignment was made to create diversity. Kramer is consistent with assignment cases decided under the statutes that preceded the anti-collusion statute. 60 It reaffirmed the principles
53
54
55

394 U.S. 823 (1969).

Id. at 825, 827-28.
See C. WRIGHT, supra note 29, at 168.
56 This agreement denoted the pay-back as a "Bonus." Kramer, 394 U.S. at 824.
57 Id.
58
Caribbean Mills v. Kramer, 392 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1968).
59 394 U.S. 823 (1969).
60 The Fifth Circuit reached this conclusion after considering the Third Circuit's
decision in Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959). In Corabi, the court
relied on the dictionary definitions of "collusive" and "improper" to interpret the mandate of § 1359. Corabi, 264 F.2d at 788. Rejecting this approach, the Caribbean Mills
court noted that "[bly focusing on the literal meanings of the two words, the [Corabi]
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formulated under the assignee clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789,61
by declaring that these rules applied to the revised statute. 62 The
Court applied these rules and concluded that Panama's assignment
was transparently collusive because it was made for jurisdictional
63
purposes only.
The Court qualified its holding by stating: "[W]e have no occasion to re-examine the cases in which this Court has held that where
the transfer of a claim is absolute, with the transferor retaining no
interest in the subject matter, then the transfer is not 'improperly or
collusively made,' regardless of the transferor's motive." 64 This careful
caveat obviated the need to overturn decisions where jurisdiction
was based upon a complete assignment of a contract claim to a diverse party. 6 5 However, the Court avoided the question of whether
the motive for a fiduciary appointment is a relevant consideration in
other situations. By not re-examining the contract assignment
cases, 6 6 the Court implicitly endorsed the principle that if there has
court virtually emasculated the statute . . . . If the statute is to have any utility, its
meaning must be derived from the pre-revision statutes and cases, not from dictionary
definitions of the individual words." CaribbeanMills, 392 F.2d at 393.
61
The original assignee clause provided that federal courts could not have jurisdiction over a suit based on a promissory note in favor of an assignee unless the suit could
have been prosecuted in federal court had no assignment been made. Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. The assignee clause was revised in 1875 to incorporate language prohibiting the collusive creation of diversity. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5,
18 Stat. 470, 472. This provision, revised in 1911, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 37, 36
Stat. 1087, 1098, was the immediate statutory predecessor to the current anti-collusion
statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982), enacted in 1948.
Tracing this legislative history, Wright, Miller, and Cooper noted that "[t]he statute, even with-or perhaps because of-successive amendments, was not well drafted,
however. One commentator referred to its 'obscure phraseology' as a 'jumble of legislative jargon.' As a result, its difficult language gave rise to a vast, and highly technical
body of decisions." FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 13, § 3639, at 90.
62
Although the statute was revised in 1948, the new code section "[did] not reflect
any change of policy with respect to the Act of 1875 and its successor statutes." Caribbean Mills, 392 F.2d at 391.
Thus, as was true prior to 1948, an action based on an assigned claim will
be barred under Section 1359 if the court determines that the assignee
possesses no real personal interest in the outcome of the litigation so that
the transfer is a sham or that the transaction otherwise should be ignored
since no consideration was given, or the assignment agreement requires
that the assignee pay a certain percentage of anything recovered on the
claim to the assignor, or that the assignor actually retains control over the
litigation. The fact that plaintiff was solicited to bring the suit has been
held not to be sufficient to demonstrate collusion. ...
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 13, § 3639, at 95-97. See 3AJ. MOORE &
J. LUCAS, supra note 41, 1705[1].
63 Kramer, 394 U.S. at 827-28.
64
Id. at 828 n.9 (emphasis added).
65
Id. (citing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286
(1904); Cross v. Allen, 141 U.S. 528 (1891)).
66 Kramer, 394 U.S. at 828 n.9.
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been a complete transfer of interest from one litigant to another, the
assignee's citizenship governs jurisdiction. 6 7 Kramer, like Mecom, left
unresolved the question of whether motive is relevant in deciding
whether federal jurisdiction exists when a litigant manipulates parties solely to create diversity. Notwithstanding this silence, lower
courts interpreted Kramer as holding that examination of motive is
68
proper in resolving jurisdictional disputes.
The import of Kramer is additionally questionable because it did
not involve estate litigation. The Court noted that it was not "necessary to consider whether, in cases in which suit is required to be
brought by an administrator or guardian, a motive to create diversity jurisdiction renders the appointment of an out-of-state representative 'improper or collusive.' "69 The Court thereby left open
the motive question in estate-related cases. 70 Like Mecom, Kramer is
most significant for the issues it chose to ignore. The Court has not
yet articulated principles governing improper or collusive joinder of
parties to create or destroy federal jurisdiction in estate litigation.
The Court has not indicated how different fiduciaries affect jurisdictional analysis. Finally, the Court has not resolved the issue whether
a litigant's motives in seeking a federal forum in estate matters are
material for establishing diversity jurisdiction. Nonetheless, lower
federal courts have proceeded as if the Supreme Court has articulated rules governing these questions.
67 See Ferrara v. Philadelphia Labs, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 1000, 1012 (D. Vt. 1967), aff'd
per curiam, 393 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1968): "[M]otive is but one of several considerations to
be taken into account and where, upon consideration of all other pertinent factors, the
transfer to the plaintiff is established as a 'real' transaction, the motive of the transferor,

standing alone, will not defeat jurisdiction." See also FEDERAL PRAGCrIE & PROCEDURE,

supra note 13, § 3639, at 99: "One question concerning assignments that remains somewhat undecided under section 1359 is whether the court should consider the assignor's
motive."
68 The Third Circuit decided that inquiry into motive was appropriate to jurisdictional analysis a year before the Supreme Court opinion in Kramer. McSparran,402 F.2d
867. Nevertheless, lower courts have interpreted Kramer as holding that examination of
motive is proper. See, e.g., Bianca v. Parke-Davis Pharmaceutical Div. of Warner-Lambert
Co., 723 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1984).
69
Kramer, 394 U.S. at 828 n.9.
70
However, the Court acknowledged that differences exist between personal representatives and assignees:
Cases involving representatives vary in several respects from those in
which jurisdiction is based on assignments: (1) in the former situation,
some representative must be appointed before suit can be brought, while
in the latter the assignor normally is himself capable of suing in state
court; (2) under state law, different kinds of guardians and administrators
may possess discrete sorts of powers; and (3) all such representatives owe
their appointment to the decree of a state court, rather than solely to an
action of the parties.
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The Statutory Framework

Confusion over federal jurisdiction in estate litigation arises
from the Supreme Court's indefinite construction of applicable statutes. In addition, the lower federal courts have provided little
assistance in construing these provisions properly. For example,
the Mecom Court analyzed the jurisdictional question in terms of a
real party in interest.71 Lower federal courts applying Mecom have
disagreed as to whether the validity of an appointment under state
72
law is dispositive of the federal real party in interest question.
Furthermore, because Kramer involved a contract assignment, the
Court's interpretation of the federal anti-collusion statute in that
case may not apply to estate jurisdiction issues. 73 Nevertheless,
many lower courts focus on the anti-collusion statute and real party
in interest rules in determining whether federal jurisdiction exists.
1.

The FederalAnti-Collusion Statute

A plain reading of the anti-collusion statute would seem to bar
federal jurisdiction when a litigant in any civil action creates diversity solely to obtain a federal forum. 74 However, the Supreme Court
has never so ruled, leaving open the question of what constitutes
Mecom, 284 U.S. at 186-87.
See, e.g., Bianca, 723 F.2d at 394-96 (administratrix's citizenship controls for diversity purposes absent finding of motive to create diversity); Betar v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., 603 F.2d 30, 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1979) (motive underlying personal
representative's appointment and representative's stake in outcome of litigation are relevant inquiries even where appointment valid under state law), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1098
(1980); Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 588 F.2d 914, 915-16 (4th Cir. 1978)
(despite Mecom, court may look to substantive relationship between administrator and
the controversy); Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101, 1105 (4th Cir. 1969) (administrator's stake in litigation is relevant even where appointment assumed valid under state
law); McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1968) (valid appointment of
guardian does not preclude inquiry into motives behind appointment), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 903 (1969).
73 See Note, Appointment of Administrator,supra note 13, at 296: "Although Kramer did
indicate that motive is not irrelevant in determining diversity, it did not override the
Mecom holding that the citizenship of the administrator controls diversity, and Mecom
represents the majority view today." For an even narrower interpretation of the Kramer
decision, see also Comment, supra note 13, at 808-09.
74 The federal anti-collusion statute states: "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly
or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." 28 U.S.C. § 1359
(1982). See generally 3AJ. MOORE &J. LUCAS, supra note 41,
17.04, 17.05; FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 13, §§ 3637-42; Note, ManufacturedFederalDiversity,
supra note 13; Note, Appointment of Administrator,supra note 13; Comment, supra note 13;
Note, Miller v. Perry: FurtherComplications in DeterminingDiversityJurisdiction,30 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 282 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, FurtherComplications in Diversity];Note,
Appointment of Non-Resident Administrators to Create Federal DiversityJurisdiction,73 YALE LJ.
873 (1964).
71
72
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75
improper or collusive manufacture of diversity in estate matters.
The appellate courts therefore rely on the Court's interpretation of
the anti-collusion statute in assignment-of-claim cases and in cases
76
involving reincorporation in diverse jurisdictions.
Traditionally, if an assignment or reincorporation is not a sham,
the motives behind the transaction are immaterial to questions of
jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction is proper provided that transfer
of interest is complete, real, and valid under state law and the transferee has some independent, legitimate interest in the underlying
legal dispute. 77 Applying the rule to the estate context, some appellate courts have concluded that if the appointed representative has
an independent, legitimate interest in the litigation, the motive behind the appointment is irrelevant to a jurisdictional
78
determination.
This construction of the anti-collusion statute has "render[ed]
the statute virtually ineffective," 79 and encouraged peculiar conclusions. In some cases, litigants have candidly admitted that the only
reason for an assignment, reincorporation, or fiduciary appointment
was to obtain a federal forum. 80 Notwithstanding such honesty,
75 See Kramer, 394 U.S. at 828 n.9 (finding it unnecessary "to consider whether...
a motive to create diversity jurisdiction renders the appointment of an out-of-state administrator 'improper' or 'collusive' ").
76 See Hackney v. Newman Memorial Hosp., 621 F.2d 1069, 1072 (10th Cir. 1980)
(Seth, CJ., concurring) (assignment of claim); McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 87374 (3d Cir. 1968) (assignment of claim); Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 78788 (3d Cir. 1959) (reincorporation).
77 See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 524 (1928) (no inquiry into motive where reincorporation in another
state was actual, not feigned, or merely colorable); see also National Sur. Corp. v. Inland
Properties, 286 F. Supp. 173, 183 (E.D. Ark. 1968), afd on other grounds, 416 F.2d 457
(8th Cir. 1969). There the court stated:
When section 1359 is invoked against an assignee who has brought suit in
a federal court, the question for determination is the genuineness of the
assignment rather than its motivation. If the assignment or transfer is
• . .bona fide,. . . section 1359 is not applicable even though the transfer or assignment may have been motivated in whole or in part by a desire
to create diversity of citienship [sic) for the purposes of litigation.
See generally 3AJ. MOORE &J. LUCAS, supra note 41,
17.05 [3.1].
78 See County of Todd, Minn. v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470, 472-73 (8th Cir. 1961);
Corabi v. Auto Racing Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 787-88 (3d Cir. 1959).
79 3AJ. MOORE &J. LUCAS, supra note 41,
171.05 [3.1].
80
"It is candidly admitted by the plaintiff-appellee that Bass was appointed administrator of Morris' estate for the sole purpose of manufacturing or artificially creating
diversity of citizenship so that the attorneys of Morris' statutory beneficiaries could invoke the jurisdiction of the District Court." Bass v. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d
763, 764 (5th Cir. 1970). See Rogers v. Bates, 431 F.2d 16, 20 (8th Cir. 1970); O'Brien v.
Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1036 (2d Cir. 1969); McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 869
(3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878, 879
(3d Cir. 1968); Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 235, 236 (2d Cir. 1963); and
Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 785 (3d Cir. 1959).
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courts have found diversity jurisdiction to exist where the transfer
was valid under substantive state law. 8 ' One court even found a
party's open admission that a fiduciary was purposefully appointed
to obtain federal jurisdiction indicated that the action was not
82
collusive.
Kramer is consistent with other assignment-of-claim precedents
construing the anti-collusion statute, but the opinion does not offer
any guidelines for identifying improper or collusive tactics.8 3 The
assignment in Kramer was patently a mere contrivance. 8 4 The Court
therefore had no difficulty in concluding that the assignment was
collusive because sham transfers have traditionally been regarded as
violative of the anti-collusion statute.8 5 The Court's failure to delineate any standards for determining collusive or improper joinder
beyond the traditional analysis limits Kramer's precedential value in
applying the anti-collusion statute to estate litigation.
Kramer, however, did articulate two important principles to govern analysis of improper or collusive joinder. First, transfers which
86
are valid under state law may violate the anti-collusion statute.
Second, the Court reaffirmed that "[t]he existence of federal jurisdiction is a matter of federal, not state law."'8 7 Some lower federal
81 See, e.g., Corabi, 264 F.2d at 788 (using a state law to create diversity is not collusive); Lang, 324 F.2d at 236 (relying on Corabi).
82 Corabi, 264 F.2d at 788. The court used WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY (2d ed.) to illuminate § 1359's prohibition against "improper or collusive"joinder of parties to manufacture jurisdiction. The court noted that the word collusive
generally connoted an illegal, secret, deceitful agreement between opposing sides of a
litigation. 264 F.2d at 788. Because the plaintiff openly admitted his purpose, it could
not be collusive. Furthermore, the dictionary defined improper as "[i]ndecent, unseemly, indecorous, unbecoming, indelicate." Looking at the plaintiff's assertion ofjurisdiction, the court could discern no impropriety according to the definition of the
term.
83
84

See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
See 394 U.S. at 827-28 (Kramer had no previous connections with parties and
reassigned a 95% interest in outcome of litigation).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 829 (noting that binding effect of assignment under state law gives no assurance that jurisdiction was not manufactured). To decide otherwise, the Court acknowledged, "would render [the anti-collusion statute] largely incapable of
accomplishing its purpose; this very case demonstrates the ease with which a party may
'manufacture' federal jurisdiction by an assignment which meets the requirements of
state law." Id.
87 Id. The plaintiff-appellant argued that because the contract assignment was valid
under Texas law, the assignment was unchallengeable for federal jurisdictional purposes. The Court rejected this contention, citing to Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Fitzgerald, 160
U.S. 556, 582 (1896). The circuit courts have rejected the analogous argument in the
estate context, namely, that the valid appointment of an estate fiduciary pursuant to
state law immunizes that appointment from scrutiny for federal jurisdictional purposes.
See, e.g., O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1969):
While a state may of course define and encourage certain fiduciary relationships, the characterization and effect of those relationships for the
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courts have interpreted these principles as authorizing an inquiry
into the motives of the parties seeking a federal forum.8 8 Other
courts analogizing to non-estate cases have regarded motive as irrelevant and required that an estate representative have a substantial
89
stake in the outcome of the litigation.
2.

The Real Party In Interest Rule

The relationship of the real party in interest rule to jurisdictional requirements in estate litigation has caused much confusion.9 0 Federal rule 1791 requires that every suit be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest, and that executors, administrators, or guardians may sue in their own names without having to
join the party for whom they are acting. 92 Lower federal courts disagree as to whether rule 17 simply states procedure or requires reference to substantive state law.
The circuit courts have taken three different approaches to the
real party in interest problem. The majority view is that the fiduciary's citizenship governs jurisdiction because the fiduciary is the real
party in interest. The Supreme Court agreed with this view in
Mecom:
purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction is a federal question ....
Accordingly, the legality of a relationship for state law purposes does not
control its effect on federal jurisdiction. That effect is determined by the
policies behind the general grant of diversity jurisdiction, and its limitation in section 1359.
Id. at 1034.
88 This is the motive/function test. See infra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
89 This is the substantial stake test. See infra notes 129-49 and accompanying text.
90 See Atkinson, supra note 13, at 926, 934-38 (arguing that language of New York
equivalent of federal real party in interest rule is confusing and misleading); Kennedy,
supra note 13, at 714-18 (arguing that language and construction of rule fails to identify
real interests at stake).
91
FED. R. Cirv. P. 17.
(a) Real PartyIn Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by
statute may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for
whose benefit the action is brought ...
(b) Capacity to Sue orbe Sued. The capacity of an individual, other than one
acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined
by the law of his domicile. .

..

In.

.

. other cases capacity to sue or be

sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court
is held. ...

(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on
behalf of the infant or incompetent person. ...
92
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). In addition, rule 17 specifies that a representative's capacity to sue is determined by state law. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
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[W]here an administrator is required to bring the suit under a
statute giving a right to recover for death by wrongful act, and is
• . .charged with the responsibility for the conduct or settlement
of such suit and the distribution of its proceeds to the persons
entitled under the statute, and is liable upon his official bond for
failure to act with diligence and fidelity, he is the real party in interest and his citizenship, rather than that of the beneficiaries, is
determinative of federal jurisdiction. 93

Some lower courts, relying on this language, have concluded that
since the fiduciary is the real party in interest and his citizenship
controls, the anti-collusion statute is irrelevant unless a party fraud-

94
ulently misrepresents facts relating to the fiduciary's appointment.
Under a second approach, the fiduciary is not automatically the
real party in interest, but is merely a substitute for the estate beneficiaries. 9 5 Therefore, a factual determination of the fiduciary's duties is necessary before the fiduciary is accorded the status of the
real party in interest for diversity purposes. 96 The factfinder must
97
determine whether the fiduciary has a stake in the litigation.
Courts adopting this approach argue that the real party determination is a question of substantive state law. 98 Thus, "[t]hese courts
have concluded that the appointment of an administrator with diverse citizenship is not dispositive of the jurisdictional question,
even if the representative has the power to sue in his own name." 99
A third approach rejects rule 17's applicability to jurisdictional
determinations in estate litigation. This approach emphasizes capacity to sue as the determinative jurisdictional factor.' 0 0 Moreover,

Mecom, 284 U.S. at 186.
See, e.g., Field v. Volkswagonwerk AG, 626 F.2d 295, 309 (3d Cir. 1980); Bush v.
Carpenter Bros., 447 F.2d 707, 710-11 (5th Cir. 1971); Deposit Guar. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Burton, 380 F.2d 346, 348 (6th Cir. 1967).
95 This is essentially the argument ofjurisdictions that require the estate representative to have a substantial stake in the outcome of the litigation in order for his citizenship to be determinative. See infra notes 129-49 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 588 F.2d 914, 917 (4th Cir.
1978) (executrix's management of decedent's estate, including prosecution of wrongful
death action, sufficient to support finding that representative is real party in interest
whose citizenship should be used to establish diversity jurisdiction).
97
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 13, § 1536.
98 See, e.g., Betar v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., 603 F.2d 30, 35 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1098 (1980); Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 291 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101, 1105 (4th Cir. 1969).
Such courts view the anti-collusion statute as a limitation on Mecom's inflexible rule that
the properly appointed fiduciary is the real party in interest. See also Gross v. Hougland,
712 F.2d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1281 (1984).
99 Gross, 712 F.2d at 1037.
100 Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 785-86 (3d Cir. 1959); Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325, 327 (3d Cir. 1955); see also FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra
note 13, § 1556 (capacity to sue test may be sharp break with real party in interest test
and is consistent with general policy of federalism under rule 17).
93

94
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federal rule 82 expressly provides that the rules of procedure cannot affect jurisdiction. 10 1 Thus, rule 17 "is merely procedural and
does not extend or limit the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court."' 1 2 Furthermore, state real party requirements do not
control a district court's determination of diversity because federal
03
courts determine their own jurisdiction.1
Most federal courts now completely disregard real party considerations when they analyze the citizenship question. The few courts
that have analyzed the real party factor have not articulated a compelling theory of the rule. Instead, real party terminology is hopelessly confused and "a number of courts have openly admitted that
certain cases are irreconcilable."' 104 Some courts have concluded
that real party rules are not relevant to their determinations while
other courts have chosen to avoid complex rule 17 interpretation. 10 5
Nonetheless, real party concerns will continue to perplex lower
courts until intelligible principles are formulated concerning con10 6
trolling citizenship in estate litigation.
C.

Tests for Determining Whether Diversity Exists in Estate
Litigation: The Muddle in the Circuit Courts

For nearly forty years, lower federal courts looked to the fiduciary's citizenship to establish diversity without examining the motive
behind the representative's appointment. Then, in McSparran v.
Weist, 10 7 the Third Circuit recognized that cases involving allegedly
manufactured jurisdiction implicated the anti-collusion statute and
that "the rivulet of 'manufactured' diversity cases [had] swollen to a
stream of wide dimensions."'' 0 8 The McSparran court noted that the
cases "in which a straw or nominal fiduciary is apointed to create
diversity stand on totally different ground than those in which the
courts are simply concerned with the general question whether the
citizenship of the personal representative or his ward or beneficiary
101
FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides that: "These rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions
therein."
102
Betar v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., 603 F.2d 30, 32 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1098 (1980).
103 See Kramer, 394 U.S. at 829.
104
Note, ManufacturedDiversityJurisdiction, supra note 13, at 715-16.
105 Id. at 715. The author notes that "most courts have held the real-party status of
the representative to be irrelevant, so that his citizenship controls in all cases where the
situs state recognizes his capacity to sue." Id. However, a minority of courts do not
disregard real party in interest considerations, viewing the fiduciary as a substitute for
the beneficiaries of the lawsuit. In these cases, the fiduciary is not automatically granted
status as the real party in interest. Id. at n.36.
106
See generally Atkinson, supra note 13; Kennedy, supra note 13.
107
402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
108 Id. at 871.
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should be the test of diversity jurisdiction."' 10 9 After examining
both the legislative history of the anti-collusion statute and the purposes underlying diversity jurisdiction, the Third Circuit concluded
that courts could no longer continue to disregard motive in their
jurisdictional inquiries. 110
McSparran is significant for two reasons. First, it rejected the
long-standing principle established in Mecom, that motive is irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes. More importantly, it fostered a
split among the circuits concerning the proper test for establishing
diversity jurisdiction when considered in relationship with the anticollusion statute. Some circuits developed a "motive/function" test
for detecting collusive manufacturing of diversity. 1 1 ' Under this
test, if a nonresident fiduciary has not been selected with a purpose
of manufacturing diversity, then the fiduciary's lack of stake in the
litigation's outcome cannot itself defeat jurisdiction. The motive/function approach requires the court to make a factual inquiry
into the motives for the fiduciary's appointment as well as an examination of his duties as estate representative. Other circuits concluded that a fiduciary must have a substantial stake in the outcome
of the underlying litigation in order to avoid violating the anti-collusion statute. 1 12 Proponents of the substantial stake test argue that if
the fiduciary has no other function than prosecuting a wrongful
death action and no stake in the outcome of that litigation, then the
anti-collusion statute prohibits the representative's citizenship from
counting for diversity purposes, even though he was appointed for
legitimate reasons.'1
These tests differ substantially in both theory and practice. A
plaintiff might meet diversity requirements under one test but fail
under the other.1 4 Two different anti-collusion tests complicate jurisdictional determination, encourage forum shopping, and foster
inconsistent results.
109

Id. The Third Circuit judicially noticed an American Law Institute study of the

diversity docket for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania during 1958-1959 in which
20.57o of diversity suits were brought by out-of-state personal representatives of Pennsylvania citizens against Pennsylvania defendants. The court also noted that one out-ofstate citizen had been appointed as guardian in 61 pending lawsuits in the district. Concluding that many of these cases probably involved improperly invoked jurisdiction in
violation of § 1359, the court commented: "The multiplication of'manufactured' diversity cases is a reflection on the federal judicial system and brings it into disrepute." Id. at
873.
110

Id. at 874. The following year, the Kramer Court ratified this conclusion. Kramer
v. Caribbean Mills, 394 U.S. 823 (1969).
111 See infra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
112 See infra notes 129-49 and accompanying text.
113 See, e.g., Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 293-95 (4th Cir. 1974).
114
See supra note 5.
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1. The Motive/Function Test for Collusive Joinder of Parties
Under the "motive/function" test, a representative's citizenship
is used to establish diversity jurisdiction, unless that representative
was appointed with a motive of creating diversity where it would not
otherwise exist. 1 5 The McSparran1 16 court was the first to suggest
that the motivation for an appointment affects jurisdiction:
While, of course, the desire to obtain diversity jurisdiction is not
itself improper, nevertheless it is not irrelevant in the determination of the question whether the fiduciary is in fact a straw fiduciary whose citizenship is to be disregarded. Moreover, it is difficult
to see how motive can be entirely ignored in ascertaining the purpose for which the representative is selected in view of the language of [the anti-collusion statute] . . . . [T]he artificial
selection of a straw representative who has no duty or function
except to offer the use of his citizenship to create diversity in contemplated litigation is a violation of [the anti-collusion]
provisions.

1 17

Whether a device is so lacking in substance as to be improper
18
and collusive under the anti-collusion statute is a question of fact.
In making this inquiry, courts examine several factors, including:
(1) the relationship of the representative to the parties represented;
(2) the nature and scope of the fiduciary's powers and duties; (3) any
special capacity or experience the fiduciary possesses with respect to
his appointment; (4) the existence of another nondiverse representative who might normally be considered the logical choice to represent the interests of the parties; (5) specific reasons for the
appointment of a nonresident fiduciary; and (6) whether the lawsuit,
apart from the appointment of a diverse fiduciary, is essentially a
local dispute.1 19
115 For background on the appointment of representatives to create diversity, see
generally Note, Manufactured Federal Diversity, supra note 13, at 719; 3A J. MOORE & J.
17.05; FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 13, § 3640.
LucAs, supra note 41,
116
McSparran v. Weist, 403 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969).
117 Id. at 874-75 (footnote omitted). This decision found support in the Supreme
Court decision in Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969). In addition to
the Third Circuit, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have adopted the motive/function approach. See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1038 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1281 (1984); Bass v. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d 763, 76567 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 975 (1971); O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d
1030, 1034-35 (2d Cir. 1969); Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969). The
Fourth Circuit, however, eventually abandoned this test. See Bishop v. Hendricks, 495
F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1975).
118 See McSparran, 402 F.2d at 876.
119 Groh v. Brooks, 421 F.2d 589, 595 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Gross v. Hougland,
712 F.2d 1034, 1038-39 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1281 (1984) (enumerating
factors to consider in analyzing motive for appointment).
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Application of this test is easy when a party concedes that the
representative is a straw party, chosen solely to create diversity jurisdiction. Courts have denied federal court jurisdiction where litigants have candidly admitted that securing diversity jurisdiction was
the sole reason for the nonresident's appointment.' 20 If a number
of factors contributed to an appointment, however, the factfinder
must weigh all the elements to determine whether creation of diversity jurisdiction was the primary reason for the appointment. Thus,
one court sustained diversity jurisdiction when it was alleged that
the out-of-state administrator was chosen to avoid close involvement in personal family problems and was experienced in financial
affairs. Although the administrator's nonresident citizenship was
also a reason for his selection, other legitimate considerations distinguished this situation from a deliberate effort to artificially create
diversity. 12 1 By contrast, where an administrator was appointed to
secure a federal forum because of alleged prejudice in state court,
the federal court viewed the appointment "as a blatant example of
precisely the type of forum-shopping that [the anti-collusion statute]
and cases like Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . were designed to
22
prevent."1
Courts and commentators have criticized the motive/function
test on practical and theoretical grounds. As a practical matter,
courts have interpreted the test to require some proof of motive,
requiring time-consuming fact-finding. Furthermore, the test is
subjective rather than objective.' 2 3 Critics object that the motive/function test "open[s] a fertile field for perjurious testimony"' 124 and elevates manufactured diversity "to an art difficult to
define and even more difficult to combat."' 12 5
A more serious criticism is that the motive/function test fails to
promote the purposes underlying diversityjurisdiction. In order for
a motive to support diversity jurisdiction, "it must be more than an
expression of sentiment or personal preference or mere kinship
120 Bass v. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d 763, 764 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 975 (1971); O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1036 (2d Cir. 1969); Mc-

Sparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969);
Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878, 880 (3d Cir. 1968).

121 SeeJoyce v. Seigel, 429 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1970) (diversity found to exist where
out-of-state administrator was experienced in financial affairs and was not closely connected to family's personal problems because these reasons were "quite different from
an effort to create artificial diversity").
122
123

O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1036 (2d Cir. 1969).
See Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878, 882 (Biggs, J., dissenting in part and con-

curring in part) ("[W]hat was in the mind of the person or persons who moved.
appoint an out-of-state executor or administrator?").
124
125

Id. at 883.
Id. at 882.
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with either the beneficiaries or the decedent. Nor can it be established by some self-serving profession of good faith in the appointment." 126 The underlying purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to
provide a federal forum for real, substantial controversies between
citizens of different states. The proper test should therefore be
whether the fiduciary has more than a nominal relationship to the
27
litigation. 1
The harshest criticism of the motive/function test has come
from those courts that reject it.128 Those courts have adopted the
"substantial stake" test, which is derived from a different interpretation of the anti-collusion statute.
2.

The SubstantialStake In the Outcome Test For CollusiveJoinder
of Parties

According to the "substantial stake" test, if a representative has
more than a nominal interest in the litigation, his appointment is not
proscribed by the anti-collusion statute. 12 9 The test requires that
the plaintiff's interest in the litigation be somewhat substantive,
rather than only procedural. This approach rejects the real party
principle that a nominal plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action in
his own name even though the proceeds of any recovery will go to
the estate beneficiaries. If the representative has no stake in the outcome of the litigation, was appointed solely for the purpose of creating jurisdiction, and "is a real party in interest only in the narrow
procedural sense of those words,"' 30 he is barred from proceeding
in federal court.
Courts that apply the substantial stake test, like those that apply
the motive/function test, evaluate the reasons for the appointment
126
Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 293 (4th Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted). Cf
Bianca v. Parke-Davis, 723 F.2d at 394 (nonresident administratrix chosen because decedent's parents were grief-stricken and psychologically incapable of prosecuting wrongful
death action).
127
"[O]nly if the Court can conclude that the out-of-state administrator has something more than a nominal relationship to the litigation will the citizenship of an out-ofstate administrator sustain diversity." Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d at 295.
128 See infra note 129 (citing cases).
129 The substantial stake test was articulated by the Fourth Circuit in Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 293-95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974), and endorsed
in a series of subsequent decisions. Messer v. American Gems, Inc., 612 F.2d 1367,
1370-71 (4th Cir. 1980); Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 588 F.2d 914, 916
(4th Cir. 1978). In addition, this approach has been adopted by the Seventh, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits. See Bettin v. Nelson, 744 F.2d 53, 56 (8th Cir. 1984), Hackney v.
Newman Memorial Hosp., 621 F.2d 1069, 1071 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982
(1980); Betar v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., 603 F.2d 30, 35-36 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1098 (1980). See generally FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note
13, § 3640, at 108-10.
130
Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101, 1106 (4th Cir. 1969).
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of the nonresident administrator. The substantial stake courts determine, however, whether the representative has more than a nom13 1 It is
inal relationship to the litigation as the estate fiduciary.
significant that reasons that might permit diversity jurisdiction
under the motive/function test may be insufficient to satisfy the substantial stake test. For example, the party's appointment of the representative because of personal preference or kinship, grief-stricken
sentiment, or reliance on the appointee's superior business judgment does not satisfy the substantial stake test.1 3 2 "[Any reason or
motive for the appointment which does not elevate his relationship
to the litigation above the level of a nominal party is irrelevant to
33
the issues of diversity.'
Factors affecting the substance of a representative's appointment include: whether the fiduciary has other assets to administer
in addition to the wrongful death suit; whether he has other duties
as the estate administrator; whether the beneficiaries may settle the
lawsuit without consulting the administrator; whether the administrator knows the facts that gave rise to the litigation; and whether
34
the administrator selects the attorney to prosecute the litigation.
When it can be shown that the estate representative was not appointed predominantly for the purpose of prosecuting the lawsuit
and "if there [was] a valid reason for the appointment of an out-ofstate administrator that gives to his representation greater substantiality than mere administrator ad litem, the citizenship of the administrator may be determinative of diversity." 3 5
When a
representative's appointment lacks such substance, the court ignores his citizenship and uses that of the beneficiaries to determine
13 6
whether diversity exists.
Lower federal courts derive the substantial stake test from the
legislative history of the anti-collusion statute and the Supreme
Court's decision in Kramer.13 7 These courts interpret the anti-collu131

Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 293-96 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056

(1974).
132
133

Id. at 294-95.
Id. at 295.

134 See Messer v. American Gems, Inc., 612 F.2d 1367, 1374 (4th Cir. 1980); Bishop
v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 294 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); Kenebrew
v. Columbia Land & Timber Co., 454 F.2d 1146, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1972); White v. Lee
Marine Corp., 434 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1970); Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d
1101, 1103 (4th Cir. 1969).
135

Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d at 293.

136 See Messer v. American Gems, Inc., 612 F.2d 1367 (4th Cir. 1980); Betar v. De
Havilland Aircraft of Can., 603 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1969); Mullins v. Seals, 562 F.2d 326
(4th Cir. 1977); Vaughan v. Southern Ry., 542 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1976); Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 298 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
137 Hackney v. Newman Memorial Hosp., 621 F.2d at 1070; Betar v. De Havilland
Aircraft of Can., Ltd., 603 F.2d at 33; Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 588 F.2d
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sion statute as denying a federal forum to lawsuits which do not
" 'really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly
within the jurisdiction' of the federal courts." 13 8 Kramer is con-,
strued to prohibit jurisdiction based on joinder of a party on "'colorable assignment or other device without substance.' ",139 Proper
federal jurisdiction, therefore, requires substantive as well as formal
validity of a representative's appointment.1 40 "It is the lack of stake
in the outcome coupled with the motive to bring into a federal court
a local action normally triable only in a state court which is the common thread of the cases holding actions collusively or improperly
brought."141
Upholding federal jurisdiction when an administrator has little
stake in the litigation and insubstantial ties to the beneficiaries
"would not advance any of the functions diversity jurisdiction was
designed to serve." 14 2 The substantial stake test best effectuates the
purpose of diversity jurisdiction because it denies a federal forum to
cases which are essentially local controversies. 1 4 3 Furthermore, the
substantial stake test is easier to apply and avoids the "difficult and
perhaps needless litigation of disputed facts [which] might well en44
courage perjury or manipulation of factual evidence."'
Critics of the substantial stake test argue that it is philosophically unsound and inconsistent with the anti-collusion statute.
Under this approach, a court may sustain diversity jurisdiction when
an administrator has a substantial stake in the litigation, even if the
at 916; Vaughan v. Southern Ry., 542 F.2d at 644; Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d at 291;
Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d at 65; White v. Lee Marine Corp., 434 F.2d at 1098; Rogers v.
Bates, 431 F.2d at 21; Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d at 1104. The Fourth Circuit, in
Miller v. Pery, noted that:
At the very least, Kramer authorizes attention to the substantive relation
of the administrator, the beneficiaries and others to the controversy
before an undiscriminating decision that the citizenship of a representative controls the determination of diversity jurisdiction.
We are obliged to read Kramer as interjecting a new note of realism
into the determination of diversity jurisdiction.
456 F.2d at 66-67.
138 Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d at 294 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982)); see McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d at 872-73.
139 Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d at 294 (quoting Kramer, 392 F.2d at 393).
140
See, e.g., id.; supra note 137 (citing cases).
141
Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d at 1106 n.11.
142 White v. Lee Marine Corp., 434 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 1970).
143
Betar v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., Ltd., 603 F.2d at 35; Vaughan v. Southern
Ry., 542 F.2d at 644; Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d at 294; Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d at
67.
144 Bianca v. Parke-Davis Pharmaceutical Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 723 F.2d
392, 398 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting White v. Lee Marine Corp., 434 F.2d at 1099 n.8);
Esposito v. Emery, 402 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1968) (Biggs, J., dissenting).
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court finds that he was chosen in order to create diversity.' 45 Conversely, jurisdiction can be denied when a fiduciary was not appointed to manufacture diversity, if the administrator lacks the
requisite substantial stake required to prosecute the wrongful death
action. 146 These critics characterize the substantial stake test as judicially-created control over diversity jurisdiction that intrudes on
the congressional prerogative to determine the scope of diversity
jurisdiction. Thus, they argue, a court cannot prohibit an administrator's access to a federal court just because he lacks a certain interest, that is, whether or not he has a substantial stake in the outcome
14 7
of the litigation.
In addition, the critics argue that the substantial stake jurisdictions incorrectly emphasize the substantive validity of an appointment, ignoring inquiries into motive. 14 8 The plain language of the
anti-collusion statute suggests that the motives underlying a representative's appointment must govern the jurisdictional inquiry. If
the representative is not appointed solely to manufacture diversity,
then his lack of stake in the litigation alone cannot trigger the prohibition against manipulatively-created jurisdiction. The substantial
stake test therefore improperly engrafts a jurisdictional requirement
on parties that is not mandated by statute or the Constitution. As
49
such, the test is an impermissible exercise of judicial power.'
D.

The American Law Institute Proposed Rule Changes

The American Law Institute has proposed a variety of statutory
145
See, e.g., Hackney v. Newman Memorial Hosp., 621 F.2d 1069 (10th Cir. 1980)
(diversity jurisdiction sustained where decedent's daughter appointed administratrix in
order to obtain diversity jurisdiction because she had real and substantial stake in outcome of wrongful death action).
146
See, e.g., Messer v. American Gems, Inc., 612 F.2d 1367 (4th Cir. 1980) (beneficiaries' citizenship controls diversity issue where administratrix had no substantive interest in wrongful death action even though there was no collusion in appointment).
147 See, e.g., Bianca v. Parke-Davis, 723 F.2d at 396 & n.4.
148
Whether the administrator has a substantial stake in the litigation,
whether he has duties above and beyond prosecution of the lawsuit, and
whether the estate contains assets other than the wrongful death claim
may all inform our judgment as to the motive for the appointment, but
none of these elements are independently necessary to sustain jurisdiction if no improper motive underlies the appointment.
Id. at 397.
149
Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper note that this approach "may involve the
expenditure of a great deal ofjudicial time and effort, in both the district court and the
court of appeals." FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 13, § 3640, at 110.
Judge Haynsworth has characterized such judicial inquiries as "a dreadful waste of
time." Bianca v. Parke-Davis, 723 F.2d at 397 (quoting The Division ofJurisdictionBetween
State and Federal Courts: Hearingson S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements inJudicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (1971) (statement of
ChiefJudge Clement F. Haynsworth)).
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changes to better effectuate the purposes underlying federal question and diversityjurisdiction.1 50 Significant proposals involving estate litigation combine an anti-collusion provision with a per se
citizenship rule for appointed fiduciaries. The proposed anti-collusion statute states that:
(a) A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action
in which any party has been made or joined improperly, or collusively, or pursuant to agreement or understanding between opposing parties, in order to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.
(b) Whenever an object of a sale, assignment, or other transfer of the whole or any part of any interest in a claim or other
property has been to enable or to prevent the invoking of federal
jurisdiction . . . jurisdiction of a civil action shall be determined

as if such sale, assignment or other transfer had not occurred.
The word "transfer" as used in this section includes the appointment of a trustee, receiver, or other fiduciary, or of any other person to hold or receive interests of any kind, whether made by
private persons or by a court or other official body. 15 1
To prevent manufactured diversity and avoid inquiries into the
motives or substance of a fiduciary's appointment, the American
Law Institute proposes that the decedent's citizenship be used to
determine diversity jurisdiction in estate litigation.
An executor, or an administrator, or any person representing the
estate of a decedent or appointed pursuant to statute with authority to bring an action because of the death of a decedent shall be
deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent; and
a guardian, committee, or other like representative of an infant or
incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same
52
State as the person represented.'
This proposal is designed to prevent manipulation of diversity
jurisdiction by the appointment of a nonresident fiduciary.' 5 3 The
drafters argue that federal courts are inappropriate fora for essentially local disputes between local citizens. 15 4 This per se rule elimiDivision ofJurisdiction Study, supra note 7.
Id. at 22-23 (proposed language for § 1307(a), (b)).
152
Id. at 11 (proposed language for § 1301(b)(4)).
153 Id. at 117 (commentary on proposed new § 1301(b)(4)).
Although the section was drafted with reference to wrongful death actions, it applies to any action by an estate representative. Id. at 118. Also, the phrasing does not
include a person who has a statutory right to bring an action in his own name, by reason
of his relationship to the decedent, such as a widow or child of the decedent. "The
imposition upon diversity jurisdiction has been the appointment of out-of-staters to create diversity, and there seems no sufficient reason to cover a person whose right to sue is
because of his relationship rather than by appointment." Id.
154 There is no proper place in federal courts for cases in which diversity has
thus been deliberately created in order to obtain a federal forum for what
would otherwise be a purely local lawsuit between co-citizens. This abuse
150

151
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nates the need for inquiring into either the motives behind a
fiduciary's appointment or his stake in the litigation.' 55 In addition,

this rule eliminates the need for complex analysis of real party
considerations.
Numerous federal courts have endorsed the proposed rule as a
sensible one because it substantially eliminates most jurisdictional
disputes.' 5 6 Commentators have approved the revisions because
the per se rule "cure[s] [the] erroneous doctrine. . . evolved by the
federal courts"' 5 7 thatjurisdiction is proper given that a representative's appointment satisfies state law requirements irrespective of
the motive behind that appointment. 5 8
Despite these endorsements, the American Law Institute proposals are flawed. Some commentators have charged that the rules
are overly broad in their attempt to prevent improper manipulation
of diversity jurisdiction.' 5 9 The per se citizenship rule "eliminates
more diversity than it ought."' 6 0 For example, it fails to allow jurisdiction where a decedent's beneficiaries are out-of-state residents,
but the decedent resided in the forum state. Moreover, the revised
anti-collusion statute does not eliminate the existing interpretation
problems because it fails to define improper and collusivejoinder of
parties. There are no federal standards for collusiveness, and the
American Law Institute proposals merely perpetuate existing
problems of interpretation. Indeed, the new language will require
difficult factual inquiries and "create fruitful ground for argument."' 16 Under the revised statutory language, diversity jurisdichas apparently not yet become pervasive, but if corrective action is not
taken, the practice is likely to spread.
Id.
Id. at 119.
See, e.g., Messer v. American Gems, Inc., 612 F.2d 1367, 1375-76 n.II (4th Cir.
1980); White v. Lee Marine Corp., 434 F.2d 1096, 1099 n.8 (5th Cir. 1970); O'Brien v.
AVCO Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1035 (2d Cir. 1969).
157 3AJ. MOORE &J. LucAs, supra note 41,
17.05[2] (footnote omitted).
158 Id. Furthermore, the authors suggest that federal courts not wait for legislative
action to correct the erroneous doctrine. Id. But see White v. Lee Marine Corp., 434
F.2d at 1099 n.8 ("However convenient [the ALI proposed] rule might seem, we agree
with the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits that it can only be adopted by legislative
action.").
159 E.g., 3AJ. MooRE &J. LUCAS, supra note 41, $ 17.05[3.-2] n.10 (criticizing ALI
proposal as denying diversity when there is no motive to create diversity and, consequently, principles underlying anti-collusion statute are not implicated); Note, Manufactured Federal Diversity, supra note 13, at 726 ("It is not necessary ... to go as far as the
ALI in order to ensure against improper attempts to create or destroy jurisdiction.").
160 Kennedy, supra note 13, at 720.
161
Id. at 721. The author points out that although § 1307(b) may be a fair compromise, it
sets up a difficult factual inquiry into the "objects" of any transaction
which creates or defeats diversity. Although this test appears simple
enough, it may be difficult to administer. Innocent claims to diversity
155
156
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tion will be suspect in all suits brought by a representative on a
cause of action arising before his appointment. For suits arising after appointment, there remains the argument that he was designated in anticipation of the action. 16 2 Finally, the proposed rules do
not suggest whose citizenship will govern when the designated fiduciary is found to have been improperly or collusivelyjoined. 16 3 The
per se citizenship rule, while an attractive palliative for federal
judges, is nevertheless unprincipled, because its arbitrary designation of the decedent's citizenship as determinative of federal jurisdiction lacks any relationship with the purposes underlying diversity
jurisdiction.
II
PROPOSAL FOR A PRINCIPLED RULE

Rules governing jurisdiction over estate litigation should be
consistent with the purposes underlying diversity jurisdiction.
Thus, the federal real party in interest rule, long referred to as a
"barnacle on the federal practice ship,"' 164 should be abolished.
Rather than assisting in the determination of citizenship in diversity
cases, this rule merely confuses their solution. 16 5 Other federal
rules relating to capacity andjoinder of parties properly address the
question of whether a representative should be regarded as a real
66
party to an action.'
jurisdiction may be plagued by arguments directed to this provision
based solely on the fact that the chain of title is traceable to a nondiverse
citizen.
Id. (footnote omitted).
162 See id. at 721-22.
163 See id. at 722. By not designating a party whose citizenship should control in
such a case, the ALI failed to remedy the very problem it sought to alleviate with a per se
rule. As of 1980, the Fourth Circuit served notice to prospective litigants that it expects
the ALI proposed rules to factor into the Court's jurisdictional determination:
Without intimating that we should or can effect the change simply by judicial pronouncement, we, nevertheless, want it known that, if a case
arises which presents the question in a way that its answer will affect the
outcome, we shall expect the issue of the applicability of the A.L.I. proposal to be raised and fully presented.
Messer v. American Gems, Inc., 612 F.2d at 1375 n. 11.
164
Kennedy, supra note 13, at 724.
165 Id. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
Professor Atkinson recommended abolition of New York's real party in interest
rule. Atkinson, supra note 13, at 958-60. He argued that "[t]he real party in interest
concept may have had some small degree of usefulness in the middle of the nineteenth
century. It has none at the present day." Id. at 964. The New York State Legislature
eventually adopted his suggested modifications. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 1004 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1984).
166 See Kennedy, supra note 13, at 724 ("Rule 19, 17(b) and substantive rules as to
stating a claim for relief are adequate without interjecting the meaningless, logically inconsistent commands of the real party in interest rule.").
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The anti-collusion statute also ought to be abolished. The concept of collusiveness "has developed no real independent federal
standards,"' 16 7 and the federal court interpretation of the anti-collusion statute "catches manipulation like a sieve."' 16 8 It is ironic that
in many instances "the typical George Washington admission of the
lawyer. . that he seeks the appointment only to pick cherries from
the diversity tree, most often brings escape from reprimand because
his truth hath made him free of collusion."' 169 Moreover, judicial
notions of improper plaintiff conduct vary from circuit to circuit, engendering inconsistent results on similar facts. 170 A positive expression of jurisdictional principles best serves the purpose of the anticollusion statute, namely to prohibit cases not properly adjudicated
in a federal forum.
Diversity jurisdiction rests on the notion that federal courts
17 1
should protect out-of-state litigants from state court prejudice.
172
Although commentators have severely criticized this rationale,
the American Law Institute argues that prejudice against out-of173
state litigants remains a viable rationale for diversity jurisdiction.
Thus, diversity jurisdiction is the proper device for alleviating "the
possible shortcomings of state justice,"' 17 4 such as the provincialism
of local judges and juries, the tendency of local courts to favor their
own over outsiders, infirmities in local practice that might jeopardize fairness, and congested state dockets which cause delays. 17 5
Assuming the utility of diversity jurisdiction, a per se rule governing citizenship in estate litigation is the best mechanism to resolve jurisdictional disputes. Adopting the per se rule would
obviate the problems that courts applying the anti-collusion statute
and the real party in interest rule have unsuccessfully attempted to
solve. An examination of the possible per se rules, evaluated in
light of the purposes underlying diversity jurisdiction, suggests that
the beneficiaries' citizenship should control the jurisdictional
inquiry.
A.

Using the Fiduciary's Citizenship to Establish Diversity
1 76
Although a number of federal courts have held otherwise,

167
168

Id.
Id. at 721.

169

Id. at 703.

170

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See Division ofJurisdiction Study, supra note 7, at 105-10.
See generally C. WmuGrr, supra note 29, at 131-34.
See Division of Jurisdiction Study, supra note 7, at 106-09.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 107-08.
See, e.g., Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 588 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1978)

171
172
173

174
175
176
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the fiduciary's citizenship should not govern jurisdiction. As a practical matter, choice of a nonresident representative is easy to manipulate while the choice of beneficiaries is more difficult and the
decedent's citizenship is virtually impossible. As a theoretical matter, protection of the fiduciary is not consonant with the purposes
underlying diversity jurisdiction. The estate representative usually
prosecutes estate-related litigation to collect and distribute any recovery to the estate beneficiaries. 1 77 Therefore, jurisdictional rules
should focus on potential prejudice to estate beneficiaries. Consider the following examples:
(1) Where all parties (decedent, defendant, beneficiaries and
fiduciary) are in-state residents, the controversy is purely local and
unlikely to result in prejudice to any party. A state forum is obviously appropriate.
(2) Where the fiduciary is the only out-of-state party, prejudice
against the nominal nonresident plaintiff is possible. However, an
in-state judge or jury should recognize this as a purely local controversy. Therefore, a foreign estate representative should not encounter prejudice. A federal forum should not be made available
for this essentially local controversy.
(3) The greatest possibility of prejudice against the nonresident representative occurs where the defendant is the only in-state
party. A local forum will likely protect its citizen involved in litigation brought by an out-of-state victim, estate representative, and
beneficiaries. This action belongs in a less biased forum, but not
because of possible prejudice against the estate fiduciary; rather, because of potential bias against the out-of-state decedent or
beneficiaries.
(4) Where there is an in-state decedent, an in-state defendant,
out-of-state beneficiaries, and an out-of-state fiduciary, there may be
prejudice against the nonresident representative. However, it is uncertain whether a local forum would discriminate in favor of an instate defendant, when the decedent was also a local citizen. The
court may view this dispute as brought by one of its own citizens and
therefore deserving of favorable review, notwithstanding the fact
that the beneficiaries and the representative are foreigners. If prejudice occurs, it is possible that it will favor the decedent. Therefore,
it is questionable whether a controversy of this type should have ac-

(executrix's citizenship controls diversity determination); Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421
(8th Cir. 1962) (citizenship of administratrix governs diversity determination).
177 See generally T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF Wis.s 643, 645 (2d ed.
1953).
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cess to a federal forum. 178
The likelihood of local prejudice in any case' 79 does not result
from the presence of a nonresident fiduciary. Therefore, jurisdic-

tional rules should refer to the parties ultimately affected by the litigation: the decedent and the beneficiaries.
B.

Using the Decedent's Citizenship to Establish Diversity
The American Law Institute has proposed that the decedent's

citizenship be used to establish diversity jurisdiction in estate-related litigation. 180 However, the American Law Institute provides
no reasons for choosing the decedent's citizenship over the beneficiaries' or the representative's, and as such, has supplied no principled basis for choosing one party's citizenship in preference to any
other's. 18 1
There are many reasons why the decedent's citizenship should
govern jurisdiction. As a practical matter, the rule would minimize
manipulation because the decedent's citizenship cannot be manipulated for jurisdictional purposes in the ways that the administrator's
or beneficiaries' citizenship are susceptible to manipulation. As a
theoretical matter, the decedent more closely resembles a real party
in interest because his estate recovers the proceeds of any estaterelated litigation. Furthermore, the decedent's desires concerning
the ultimate disposition of his property are central to estate admin-

istration, and a state court's primary interest is to effectuate that intent. Thus, the decedent, rather than the beneficiaries or the estate
82
fiduciary, is the center of gravity in estate cases.'
178 Nevertheless, because a per se rule is desirable, see infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text, this type of controversy should not be heard in a federal forum.
179 Additional combinations of parties are conceivable where an in-state administrator sues an out-of-state defendant.
180 See supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
181
The only stated rationale for this rule is that a per se citizenship rule would obviate the need for an inquiry into the motives behind the fiduciary's appointment. Division ofJurisdiction Study, supra note 7, at 119. The ALI gives no indication, however,
why it chose the decedent's citizenship as the basis for its per se rule. One commentator
objected to the ALI formulation, stating that: "the decedent is the only one in the whole
world who literally has no interest in the proceedings .... " Farage, Proposed Code Will
Emasculate FederalJurisdiction,2 TRIAL, Apr./May 1966, at 30-32. But c. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 16 (1968) (approving ALU
rule because other possible rules too difficult to administer).
182
See generally T. ATKINSON, supra note 177. On the construction of wills in general,
Atkinson states the general rule for probate:
If possible, a will should be interpreted according to its terms viewed in
the light of the general circumstances surrounding the testator in order
to effectuate his intention. ...
The rules of construction should be flexibly applied so as not to defeat
such intention as may be manifested in the will. ...
Id. at 807.
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On balance, however, using the decedent's citizenship to determine jurisdiction is not consonant with the purposes underlying federal diversity jurisdiction. This is dearest in litigation where the
beneficiaries are the only out-of-state residents. If the decedent's
citizenship governed jurisdiction in these cases, the nonresident
beneficiaries would be denied a federal forum. However, in these
situations a state court may be prejudiced against the nonresident
beneficiaries, even though the decedent and his administrator are
local residents. The court might be reluctant to award substantial
damages to remote, unknown beneficiaries, especially when the defendant is a local resident. l8 3 Indeed, commentators have criticized
the American Law Institute proposal that the decedent's citizenship
control as overly restrictive because it would deny nonresident ben84
eficiaries the benefits of a federal forum.'
C.

Using the Beneficiaries' Citizenship to Establish Diversity

Most cases suggest that the estate beneficiaries are the true locus of concern in estate litigation because they are the parties who
will benefit from any estate-related recovery.'8 5 Consequently, a
per se rule in estate litigation should provide that the beneficiaries'
citizenship control jurisdiction. It obviates factual problems conceming the motive behind or substantial stake in the outcome of the
litigation. Testators are likely to name the natural objects of their
bounty as beneficiaries, rather than selecting them with creating diversity jurisdiction in mind. Beneficiaries are designated well in advance of any anticipated litigation or are designated by law if the
joinder
decedent dies intestate. Therefore, collusion or improper
86
of parties to manipulate diversity jurisdiction is unlikely.'
This rule best effectuates the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
It protects litigants from the potential inadequacies of local justice.
Where estate beneficiaries are all in-state residents and the defend183 Several empirical studies have attempted to determine whether state courts and
juries are biased against nonresident litigants. See Goldman & Marks, DiversityJurisdiction
and Local Bias: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL SruD. 93 (1980) (local bias is
relevant but not highly important factor in attorneys' choice of federal or state forum);
Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IowA L. REv.
933 (1962) (local bias is insignificant factor in forum choice); Note, The Choice Between
State and FederalCourt in Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51 VA. L. REv. 178 (1965) (local bias is
somewhat important factor in choice of forum but never the most important factor).
184
E.g., 3AJ. MooRE &J. LucAs, supra note 41, 17.0513.-2] n.10; Kennedy, supra
note 13, at 720.
185 E.g., Mullins v. Seals, 562 F.2d 326, 327-38 (4th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Perry, 456
F.2d 63, 67-68 (4th Cir. 1972).
186 The Fourth Circuit, in Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., Inc., 588 F.2d
914, 917 (4th Cir. 1978), pointed out that "the designation of a nonresident executor in
one's will, before a wrongful death suit is even imagined, cannot be so tainted."
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ant is also an in-state resident, the controversy is purely local and
should be adjudicated in state court. However, where the beneficiaries are nonresidents, local prejudice is likely, especially if the defendant is a local citizen. Such a case belongs in federal court.
The major problem with this rule arises when there are some
beneficiaries in-state and others out-of-state. In these situations, the
presence of one in-state beneficiary will destroy diversity jurisdiction under the "complete diversity rule."' 8 7 Certainly, if in-state
beneficiaries predominate, then the litigation is best characterized
as a local controversy that should be adjudicated by state courts.
But where out-of-state beneficiaries predominate, the case is not a
local controversy, and the nonresident beneficiaries should not forfeit their right to a less biased federal forum because an in-state
party destroys diversity. In these situations an out-of-state beneficiary should be designated as a "class representative" to allow his citizenship to control for federal jurisdictional purposes. l8 8 This
formulation would conform to the principle underlying diversity jurisdiction, that federal courts should be available to resolve real,
substantial controversies between citizens of different states.
Applying this rule to the three cases described earlier' 8 9 would
lead to proper jurisdictional conclusions. In the first case, which involved a lawsuit by an Illinois estate administrator representing Indian beneficiaries against a Canadian corporation, the court applied
the substantial stake test and concluded that the administrator
lacked an interest in the litigation sufficient to justify removal to a
federal forum. 19 0 The court reached the right result for the wrong
reasons. The court reasoned that use of the administrator's citizenship would bring within the court's diversity jurisdiction an action
between aliens and that diversity jurisdiction was not intended to
achieve this result.' 9 1 Although the court applied the substantial
stake test to the estate administrator, it actually relied on the beneficiaries' citizenship when it concluded that the underlying litigation
was a conflict between aliens of two foreign nations and therefore
187 This is a consequence of the complete diversity rule which was first articulated in
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3Cranch) 267 (1806). See generally C. WRIosrr, supra note
29, at 140-42.
188 See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1968) (class action allowed in federal
court even though no complete diversity); Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255
U.S. 356 (1921) (same). This principle permits a shareholder to bring a derivative suit
in federal court even when there is no complete diversity. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 29,
at 170.
189 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
190
See Betar v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can., 603 F.2d 30, 35-36 (7th Cir. 1979)
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1098 (1980).
191
Id. at 35.
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not justiciable in federal court.1 9 2 Had the court used the beneficiaries' citizenship per se rule, it wouldhave reached the same result
more directly.
In the second case,' 9 3 use of the beneficiaries' citizenship rule
would have produced a different result. There, an out-of-state administratrix brought a wrongful death action on behalf of parents
194
who were allegedly prostrate with grief over their child's death.
The court concluded that the administratrix's citizenship would govern jurisdiction unless she had been named in order to create diversity.' 9 5 If the court had applied the per se rule based on the
beneficiaries' citizenship, it would not have granted jurisdiction because the beneficiaries and the defendants were citizens of Mississippi.' 9 6 This was essentially a local dispute and therefore not the
kind of controversy appropriate for federal court.
In the third case, 19 7 all beneficiaries were citizens of Oklahoma,
except one, who was a citizen of Colorado. 198 She was appointed
administratrix and instituted a wrongful death action in federal
court. Shortly thereafter she moved to Oklahoma and made that
her permanent residence. 199 The court applied the substantial stake
test and held that there was diversity jurisdiction. 20 0 However, application of the per se rule focusing on the beneficiaries' citizenship
would bar this suit from federal court. Because the defendants and
most of the beneficiaries were residents of Oklahoma, 20 ' this case
presented a local controversy which a state court could fairly adjudicate. The court's use of the substantial stake test thus resulted in an
outcome at odds with the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

Diversity jurisdiction in estate-related litigation has been problematic. Because the Supreme Court has not provided clear guidance, the lower federal courts have articulated a variety of rules,
principles, and tests to govern the jurisdictional analysis. As a result, the federal courts disagree as to whose citizenship should be
used to determine diversity. Some courts look to the estate fiduciId.
Bianca v. Parke-Davis Pharmaceutical Div. of Warner-Lambert Co., 723 F.2d 392
(5th Cir. 1984).
192

193
194

Id. at 394.

Id. at 398-99. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further inquiry into the motive behind the administratrix's appointment. Id.
195

196

Id. at 394.

197

Hackney v. Newman Memorial Hosp., 621 F.2d 1069 (10th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1069, 1071.
Id. at 1070.
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1070.

198
199
200
201
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ary, others look to the beneficiaries, and the American Law Institute
advocates that courts look to the decedent. In addition, opinions
are muddled by abstruse discussions of real party in interest rules
and by imprecise analyses of improper and collusive joinder. The
motive/function and substantial stake tests require evidentiary hearings which invite perjurious and self-serving testimony, and the
courts have failed to develop any standards for collusiveness. Furthermore, the use of different tests by different jurisdictions has produced inconsistency. In short, rules relating to diversity jurisdiction
in estate litigation fail to assure principled, just results.
The major inadequacy of current jurisdictional rules is their
failure to effectuate the purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction.
Those purposes would best be served by a per se rule that in estaterelated litigation the beneficiaries' citizenship is used to determine
whether diversity exists. To this end, Congress should promulgate
a per se rule to this effect. The anti-collusion statute should be
amended or, in the alternative, abandoned as the lodestar of jurisdictional analysis in these cases. The Supreme Court should also
reject the tests currently utilized by the circuits in resolving jurisdictional disputes, and definitively hold that the beneficiaries' citizenship is the only just, appropriate determinant of federal jurisdiction.
This rule would be easy to apply, and would obviate the difficulties
of the motive/function and substantial stake tests. More important,
this rule would ensure that federal courts hear only those lawsuits
involving real, substantial controversies between citizens of different
states.

